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RECENT DECISIONS
partners were sufficient to discharge the outstanding liabilities, but
have become inadequate thereafter. A special partner may not re-
ceive any part of his capital contribution until all liabilities of the
partnership have been paid. By statute, "when a contributor has
rightfully received the return in whole or in part of the capital of
his contribution, he is nevertheless liable to the partnership for any
sum, not in excess of such return with interest, necessary to dis-
charge its liabilities to all creditors who extended credit or whose
claims arose before such return." 3 In such a situation, his contribu-
tion may be treated as a trust fund for the discharge of liabilities,4
and until those liabilities are discharged he assumes the risk of any
change in circumstances whereby the remaining partners are unable
to meet the demands of creditors. The equity thus established in
favor of the partnership is one to which the creditors succeed,5 and
consequently they may pursue their remedies against a solvent part-
ner whose obligation can be discharged by nothing less than payment
to the extent of his contribution to the partnership plus interest for
the use of the money.
D. J. R.
PATENTS-JURISDICTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL CouRTS.-
Defendant, an inventor, applied for letters patent upon a device;
simultaneously with the execution of the application, he assigned the
device and invention to a corporation; while the application was
pending, the corporation was adjudicated a bankrupt and the plaintiff
became the owner of the device and invention by assignment from the
trustee in bankruptcy of the corporation. At that time, the original
application had lapsed and the inventor wrongfully obtained a patent
upon the same device which he had previously assigned and is offering
it for sale. Plaintiff seeks an injunction restraining the defendants
from manufacturing or dealing in the invention or device. A motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the courts of the United
States have sole jurisdiction of the subject of the action was granted
by the Special Term and affirmed by the Appellate Division. On
appeal, held, reversed; the question involved is one of title based
upon the assignment and the state courts have jurisdiction even
though the invention is covered by a patent. New Era Electric
Range Co. v. Serrell, 252 N. Y. 107, 169 N. E. 105 (1929).
Independent of copyright or letters patent, an inventor or author
has, by the common law, an exclusive property in his invention or
3 Uniform Limited Partnership Act, Sec. 17, Subd. 4; New York Partner-
ship Law, Sec. 106, Subd. 4.
'Hurd v. New York & C. Steam Laundry Co., 167 N. Y. 89, 60 N. 1. 327
(1901); Hazard v. Wight, 201 N. Y. 399, 94 N. E. 855 (1911); Irvine v.
New York Edison Co., 207 N. Y. 425, 101 N. E. 358 (1913).
Saunders v. Reilly, 105 N. Y. 12, 19, 12 N. E. 170 (1887); Bulger v.
Rosa, 119 N. Y. 459, 24 N. E. 853 (1890).
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composition, until by publication it becomes the property of the gen-
eral public.1  Like other property rights, it is assignable. The effect
of the assignment being to leave the assignee free to deal with the
property right assigned as he wills, 2 a wronged assignee may seek the
proper relief in a court of competent jurisdiction. By statute, the
courts of the United States have jurisdiction exclusive of the courts
of the several states "of all cases arising under the patent right or
copyright laws of the United States." 3 The jurisdiction of the state
courts, however, is not so circumscribed that it may not determine a
cause of action relating to the subject matter of a patent right, pro-
vided it does not involve the validity of the patent. 4  The rights of
the patentee under the patent laws must be directly and not collater-
ally brought in issue to give the federal courts jurisdiction, 5 and the
determination of a question which does not arise under those laws,
but is merely incidental thereto, is not beyond the competency of the
state tribunals.6 In the case at bar, the plaintiff's right to the device
did not arise under or directly involve the patent law but is based
upon the assignment of the defendant's property right in the inven-
tion. If the patent subsequently issued to the defendant is invalid
because of plaintiff's ownership thereof, the void patent can afford no
protection to the defendant.
The court is here called upon to determine the plaintiff's right
to the invention by virtue of the defendant's assignment. The nature
of the right to be enforced or wrong redressed is founded in contract,
in that defendant had done acts in violation of the rights secured to
plaintiff by the assignment. It is clearly not a suit involving the
validity of the patent or one arising under the patent right laws of
the United States, of which the federal courts have exclusive juris-
diction, but one to construe or enforce a contract relating to a patent,
'Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30, 23 N. E. 12, 16 Am. St. Rep. 740
(1889); Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532 (1870); Potter v. McPherson, 21
Hun 559 (1880) ; Hommer v. Barnes, 26 How. Pr. 174; Kiernan v. M. Q. Tel.
Co., 50 How. Pr. 194.
"Garfield v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 298 Fed. 659, 660 (S. D. N. Y.
1924).
'Judicial Code and Judiciary, Sec. 256, amended 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 371.
See Parsons v. Barnard, 7 Johns. 144 (1810); Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9
Johns. 507 (1812); Hovey v. Rubber Tip Pencil Co., 57 N. Y. 119, 15 Am.
Rep. 470 (1874); New York Phonograph Co. v. Davega, 127 App. Div. 222,
111 N. Y. Supp. 363 (1908).
'Blakeney v. Goode, 30 Ohio St. 350 (1876); Maurice v. Devol, 23 W.
Va. 247 (1883).
'Teas v. Albright (C. C. N. J., 1882), 13 Fed. 406, 441, aff'd 106 U. S.
613, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 550 (1883).
'Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co., 168 U. S. 255, 259 18 Sup. Ct. Rep.
62, 64 (1897)
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involving a question of title, which is properly within the jurisdiction
of the state courts. 7
R.L.
REAL PROPERTY-LANDLORD AND TENANT-MEASURE OF DABI-
AGES ON BREACH OF COVENANT.-Defendant leased premises encum-
bered by a mortgage to the plaintiff and expressly covenanted that
the plaintiff lessee might "peaceably and quietly have, hold and enjoy
the said demised premises for the term aforesaid." Subsequently,
defendant conveyed the fee in the premises to another who defaulted
in payment of interest on the mortgage. Plaintiff was evicted under
foreclosure proceedings and now sues for breach of the covenant,
claiming substantial damages. Defendant contends that no damages
may be recovered unless it be the return of rent paid in advance. A
verdict was directed in favor of defendant. On appeal, held, re-
versed; new trial ordered. Substantial damages measured by the
value of the lease less rent reserved may be recovered. Ganz v.
Clark, 252 N. Y. 92, 169 N. E. 100 (1929).
The law applicable to the case is apparent in a restatement of the
tenets of the leading case of Mack v. Patchin.' Ordinarily in an
action by a lessee against a lessor for breach of a covenant of quiet
enjoyment, due to a defective title, recovery is limited to the amount
of rent paid in advance and mesne profits for which the lessee is
liable. The reason for the rule is that "owing to the state of the
law as to real property, the undoubted owner of an estate often finds,
unexpectedly, difficulty in making out title, which he cannot over-
come." 2 Frequently, the difficulty lies in defects of title of ancient
origin, and the present owner should not be unduly penalized for de-
ficiencies in no way attributable to lack of good faith or diligence on
his part. Consequently, the rule is limited in its application to those
cases in which there is no fraud, inequitable conduct or failure to
act when it is in his power to act.3 In the instant case, there was a
'Nichols v. Marsh, 61 Mich. 509, 28 N. W. 699, rehearing denied (1886),
29 N. W. 37, 62 Mich. 439 (1891), and writ of error dismissed, 140 U. S. 344,
11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 798 (1891); New Marshal Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine
Co., 223 U. S. 473, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 238 (1912), aff'g 199 Mass. 546, 85 N. E.
741 (1908); Phinney v. Annan, 107 Mass. 94 (1871); Becher v. Contour
Laboratories, 279 U. S. 388, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356 (1929), aff'g 29 Fed. (2nd)
31 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1928). See also David v. Park, 103 Mass. 501 (1870),
which was an action for deceit in the sale of patent rights, wherein it was held
that the state court had jurisdiction although its determination involved collat-
erally the question of the construction and validity of the letters patent issued
by the government.
142 N. Y. 167 (1870). Cf. Matter of Strasburger, 132 N. Y. 128, 30 N. E.
379 (1892); and distinguish Wagner v. Van Schaick Realty Company, 163
App. Div. 632, 148 N. Y. Supp. 638 (lst Dept. 1914).
-Engle v. Fitch, 3 Law Rep. Q. B. 314, per Chief Judge Cockburn.
'In an action against the vendor of real property for breach of warranty
the vendee can recover substantial damages "if the vendor is guilty of fraud;
